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BEYOND THE VIOLENCE
INDIAN AGRICULTURE, WHITE REMOVAL, AND
THE UNLIKELY CONSTRUCTION OF THE NORTHERN
CHEYENNE RESERVATION, 1876-1900

JAMES R. ALLISON III

Upon first glance, a specific act of violence seemed to fix the particular location
of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation. On
December 12, 1880, the prominent Northern
Cheyenne chief, Little Wolf, staggered into a
white-owned trading store near Fort Keogh,
Montana Territory, and, in a drunken stupor,
shot and killed a fellow Cheyenne named
Starving Elk. Enraged at Starving Elk for gambling with his daughter, Little Wolf committed the most atrocious act a Cheyenne could

commit, the killing of another Cheyenne.
Blood spilled within the tribe polluted the
Mahuts, the four sacred arrows the Creator
gave to the Cheyenne people to mark them as
distinct from other mortals and forever bind
them to him.! As one of the four Old Man
Chiefs of the tribe, Little Wolf understood
that defiling the Mahuts disrupted the unity
between the Cheyenne and their Creator,
creating trouble for his people. Immediately
sobered and embarrassed, and understanding that custom demanded retribution from
Starving Elk's kin, Little Wolf dropped his rifle
and reportedly declared, "I am going up on that
hill by the bend of the creek. If anybody wants
me I'll be there."2
Although disgraced and initially cast
out by much of the tribe, the pull of Little
Wolf remained strong, and within a year,
eighty-six Cheyenne families followed Little
Wolf to his self-imposed exile near Rosebud
Creek. 3 To most observers, this blind loyalty
to a fallen leader required little explanation.
After all, Little Wolf had recently led his
people in a costly yet courageous escape from
Indian Territory, fighting through the dead
of winter back to the Northern Cheyenne's
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ancestral Montana homeland, and in the
process attained a cultlike status. Thankful
to have survived their deadly encounters in
the Northern Plains, these obedient followers
appeared simply to cast their lot with their
military and spiritual leader, following him to
wherever his violent acts led. When this small
community soon prospered to the point that
just four years later President Chester Arthur
declared a Northern Cheyenne Reservation
in the specific area surrounding Little Wolf's
exile, the amazing story of the resilient and
defiant Northern Cheyenne seemed complete.4
Little Wolf guided his people through the harrowing escape back to Montana, and his final
act of violence dictated the specific location of
their federally sanctioned home.
This explanation for the ultimate location
of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation fits well
within the narrative of violence that too often
dominates accounts of this and other nineteenth-century Plains Indian tribes. Typically
framed as tales of heroic or bloodthirsty whites
combating noble or savage Indians, popular
understandings of current reservation locations
are either a depressing tale of Indians being
herded onto undesired wastelands or a romantic
saga of perseverance and violence where Indian
groups are ultimately awarded a small piece of
their ancestral homeland as a token for past sacrifices. s The Northern Cheyenne historiography
is as guilty as any other in perpetrating these
tales of violence that overshadow other important aspects of frontier life, most notably the
many pragmatic adaptations Indians undertook
in their search for subsistence and sovereignty.
Inevitably fore grounding the improbable escape
from Indian Territory to their Montana homeland and concluding with Little Wolf's final act
of violence, these Northern Cheyenne histories
proudly explain that militant Indian defiance
eventually produced a reservation where there
was none, and then the tribe fought passionately
to defend and expand this refuge by the dawn of
the twentieth century.6
As with most tidy narratives, however, the
reality of the Northern Cheyenne is more
complicated. More than blindly following a

martial hero whose violent acts dictated the
locale of their new home, those families that
joined Little Wolf did so because the land upon
which he settled offered greater opportunities
for sustenance, and by extension, control over
their lives. The sheltered and fertile river valleys surrounding Rosebud Creek not only supported ample game for traditional Cheyenne
subsistence hunting, but more importantly
to securing a reservation, provided an ideal
setting for irrigated farming and ranching,
practices the Cheyenne adopted with great
success while imprisoned at Fort Keogh. There,
under Little Wolf's pragmatic leadership, the
Cheyenne learned the value of providing their
own subsistence in ways acceptable to federal
authorities, noting that the less they depended
upon federal rations, the more daily freedom
they had to continue indigenous traditions
vital to their community. Understanding that
subsistence and sovereignty were intimately
entwined, the Northern Cheyenne selectively
incorporated certain agricultural practices to
retain control over their own existence'?
In addition to maintaining this control,
adopting Anglo subsistence practices that
conformed to federal mandates and cultural
expectations for "civilizing" western Indians
also secured important federal allies, such as
Fort Keogh commander and Cheyenne champion Colonel Nelson Miles. In fact, by the time
Cheyenne families began leaking out of Fort
Keogh after Little Wolf's violent act, Indian
efforts to farm and ranch had so pleased federal
officers that the military actually supported this
otherwise illegal migration, supplying farming
supplies and manpower to assist the burgeoning
agricultural community. This federal support
would continue through the settlement's early
years when local whites protested-sometimes
violently-the notion of Indians possessing the
area's best land, and culminated in a successful
petition for the reservation's establishment. In
the end, the Northern Cheyenne's willingness
to adopt Anglo agricultural practices-which
they understood could provide subsistence,
greater freedoms, and key federal allies-best
explains the creation of the reservation.
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To the Northern Cheyenne's white supporters, the 1884 reservation was a crucial step in
the project to settle this "most fierce and warlike tribe," circumscribing the Cheyenne in a
tightly controlled spatial logic that segregated
the tribe from the wild and chaotic frontier
conditions so they could be managed to meet
white expectations. Trusting that a systematic
ordering of the reservation would enhance
the Northern Cheyenne's safety, increase
agricultural production, and bring important
civilizing benefits, Cheyenne allies supported
Superintendent John Tully's 1891 explanation
that what the Indians really needed was the
"boundering [sic] of lines on the East [of the
reservation] ... and that all the whites be
bought off and a wire fence be built all around
the Reservation hog tight and cattle strong."s
Clearly demarcated lines segregating the civilizing Northern Cheyenne from the unplanned
and chaotic frontier would ensure their safe
progression to civilization.9
As events played out, however, it became
clear that the original reservation grant was
insufficient to meet either Indian or white
expectations. As more Northern Cheyenne
returned to Montana, and the military enrolled
them in the civilizing project on the tiny reservation, land and resources became scarce,
forcing some Indians to look off-reservation for
subsistence. When a few Cheyenne began to
prey upon the country's animal stock, including both wildlife and white-owned cattle, area
ranchers denied these were survival tactics and
deplored them as evidence of the Indians' immutable savagery. Similar to the spatial logic used
by Northern Cheyenne allies to confine Indians
to the "orderly and productive" reservation,
critics imposed temporal limits upon Northern
Cheyenne actions, refusing to conceive of
Indians as anything but primitive, nomadic savages incapable of progressing into civilization.
Faced with perceived intractable hostiles in
their midst, non-Indian ranchers then launched
a passionate effort to remove the Northern
Cheyenne from the region's prized bottom lands.
During the reservation's early years, predictably violent encounters ensued between
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the mobile and hungry Cheyenne and fearful
ranchers protecting their livestock. While
historians have seized upon these recurring
episodes to justify the narrative of violence
driving explanations for the 1900 expansion
of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation, these
encounters are understood best not as the product of militant Indian defiance, but within the
context of diverse groups struggling to possess
pockets of highly desirable land in a region
short on such attractive options. The result was
a clash of mutually exclusive claims to the land,
neither of which allowed room for the presence
of the other in this contested space. Thus,
even when the Northern Cheyenne seemed
to accept white patterns of subsistence like
farming and ranching, local whites engaged in
those same practices refused to see Indians as
capable of such civilized pursuits. Fortunately
for the Northern Cheyenne, efforts to farm
and ranch did transform federal perceptions of
these Indians into a people capable of civilization and deserving of a reservation. Federal
allies consistently intervened on the Northern
Cheyenne's behalf and ultimately expanded
the reservation's boundaries and removed
troublesome whites. Again, the Northern
Cheyenne's ability to understand the changed
conditions in the Northern Plains and adopt
settled subsistence practices that met federal
expectations resulted in the unlikely construction of an enlarged and exclusive reservation.
A HOME OF THEIR OWN: EARLY NORTHERN
CHEYENNE AGRICULTURAL EFFORTS

Most histories of the Northern Cheyenne
provide the infamous 1876 Battle of Little
Bighorn as the high-water mark of tribal resistance in the Northern Plains. From this heroic
peak, the saga of the Northern Cheyenne typically devolves into a tale of a fragmented tribe
being relentlessly pursued by an embarrassed
and angered federal military. Ultimately, this
reinvigorated military force would pressure
the Northern Cheyenne into surrender, resulting in the tribe's removal to Indian Territory.
There, in an unfamiliar land plagued by
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insufficient rations, inhospitable hosts, and
virulent diseases, two Northern Cheyenne
leaders-Dull Knife and Little Wolf-would
make the fateful decision to lead approximately
300 Cheyenne out of Indian Territory and
back to Montana. As the story goes, this group
fought a heroic, rearguard battle through the
dead of winter back to Montana, eliciting the
respect, sympathy, and outright fear of federal
authorities, who ultimately chose the path of
least resistance and granted the tribe a small
reservation in a sparsely populated region. In
this traditional telling, only militant resistance
and the loss of Cheyenne blood could eventually produce a home of their own.1°
While these colorful and important histories do good work in reversing the more
typical declension narrative of the helpless
and doomed Indian tribe, they fail to provide a
convincing explanation for how the Northern
Cheyenne came to secure this home of their
own without the benefit of a federal treaty
providing one. Certainly, armed resistance
played a key role in delivering particular groups
of Northern Cheyenne back to Montana from
their exile in Indian Territory, but as Christina
Berndt points out, these groups arrived in the
Powder River Basin in the spring of 1879, a full
five years before the reservation's establishment. Berndt shows there is little evidence
indicating that the tragic events surrounding
Dull Knife and Little Wolf's escape from Indian
Territory influenced federal officials to look
favorably on the Northern Cheyenne's situation.H If anything, federal officials were more
divided over what to do with the Northern
Cheyenne after their return to Montana, contemplating options ranging from removal back
to Indian Territory to placing the Northern
Cheyenne on the nearby Crow or Sioux reservations. At the very least, it is clear that
violence alone cannot explain why the federal
government would exert so much energy to
defeat a recalcitrant tribe in 1877 and yet cave
to these same methods seven years later and
award a reservation. There is more to this story.
Foremost among the complicating factors that resulted in a Northern Cheyenne

Reservation was the Indians' willingness to
engage in the "civilized" pursuits of settled
ranching and agriculture. 12 Almost immediately upon their return to Montana, the
Northern Cheyenne began raising crops and
cattle in an attempt to provide subsistence and
avoid further confrontations. The flight from
Indian Territory had taken a terrible toll on
the tribe, delivering barely half its original participants back to their Montana homeland in
the spring of 1879. Beyond the cost in human
lives, however, this trek clearly revealed to
the Northern Cheyenne the changed circumstances in the Northern Plains and cemented
their desire for a settled existence. Harassed
at each point along their journey, there was
no part of that country where the tribe could
now live undisturbed. Little Wolf clearly
recognized this, and upon entry to Montana,
he quickly sought to surrender to Lieutenant
William Philo Clark, an officer he had previously scouted with and grown to respect.
Finding Clark accompanied by his chief scout,
the Northern Cheyenne Two Moons, who had
surrendered shortly after the Battle of Little
Bighorn, Little Wolf explained his travails in
the south and then noted his few remaining
people only "wanted a little ground where we
could live." Thanking Clark for his willingness
to "talk before fighting," Little Wolf seemed
to grasp the enormity of this final surrender,
declaring in poetic terms, "[I]r looks as though
the wind, which has made our hearts flutter
for so long, would now go down."13 Coming to
terms with these changed circumstances, Little
Wolf and his people determined to lead a new,
settled life in their old, reclaimed home.
Convinced of the Northern Cheyenne's
resolve to settle in Montana, Clark lobbied
agains~another costly removal. Writing to his
superiors that spring, Clark argued,
[The Northern Cheyenne] are weary with
constant fighting and watching. They
want peace, rest, and a home somewhere
in this country where they were born and
reared. . . . Should they be ordered back,
they may seek escape by throwing them-
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selves against the bullets and bayonets of
the soldiers, or by suicide. If allowed to stay
they would be among our strongest, best and
bravest allies.1 4
Ultimately, his superiors agreed. Seeing the
potential utility of enrolling more Cheyenne
scouts in their recurring hostilities with the
Sioux, federal officials allowed the Northern
Cheyenne to stay at Fort Keogh as prisoners of
war.1 5 For their part, the Northern Cheyenne
understood what was required of them to
remain in Montana. Numbering close to 400
with the unification of Two Moons' and Little
Wolf's bands, these Indians needed to demonstrate loyalty to the United States and a fervent
desire to pursue a settled agricultural existence.
As to the first demand, Little Wolf himself
enlisted as a "sergeant" in the federal army's
continued campaign along the Canadian
border against Sitting Bull's restless Sioux. In
addition to his military service, Little Wolf
further strengthened his relationship with
Lieutenant Clark, as the two spent long hours
together collaborating on a book on Indian
sign language. The chief's desire to remain
at peace was so strong that when news came
that several of his former warriors had killed
a soldier, Little Wolf himself called for justice.
Noting that local laws called for swift punishment, Little Wolf exclaimed, "[H]ang them or
imprison them for life. I never want to see their
faces again. They knew I had made peace with
you and they killed your soldiers."16 Clearly,
the chief did not intend to upset the tenuous
relation between his people and the federal
military.
In addition to cultivating relationships,
the Northern Cheyenne also began cultivating land and cattle around Fort Keogh. In his
1879 annual report, Colonel Nelson Miles,
founder and commander of Fort Keogh, was
so pleased by Northern Cheyenne efforts to
raise cattle and crops that he felt compelled "to
invite especial attention to the Indians that
remain[ed] at Fort Keogh," explaining how
the Northern Cheyenne managed to support
themselves "without annuities or appropria-
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tions of Congress" and bragged that "the funds
realized from the sale of ponies surrendered by
[the Northern Cheyenne] have given them a
good herd of domestic cattle, and by their own
industry they have cultivated an extensive
field, and will this season raise an abundance
of vegetables, sufficient to last them during the
winter and until next summer.'>17
Months later, testifying to the Senate
select committee investigating the Northern
Cheyenne removal to and flight from Indian
Territory, Miles explained that the Indian
cattle herd had been divided between the
Cheyenne families and branded accordingly,
and that individual sections of land surrounding Fort Keogh had been allotted to
Indian families for cultivation.1 8 According
to Private George Yoakam, the "farmer boy
from Illinois" charged with monitoring the
Northern Cheyenne's agricultural efforts,
the tribe had cultivated thirty-eight acres by
the end of 1879.1 9 These Northern Cheyenne
actions had earned Miles's trust and, in his
eyes, the right to remain in their homeland.
Ironically, the relative prosperity of the
Northern Cheyenne at Fort Keogh generated
a new set of concerns for the tribe. Technically
still considered prisoners of war, a label that
allowed Colonel Miles to keep them at the fort
rather than transferred to their assigned reservations elsewhere, their presence and prosperity
at Keogh put a strain on local resources. Miles
compounded this problem in late 1879 when he
personally lobbied for the transfer to Fort Keogh
of Dull Knife and the remaining survivors from
the Northern Cheyenne's flight from Indian
Territory.20 Though the reunification of Lone
Wolf and Dull Knife's people must have generated much joy, land was becoming scarce, and
it was clear that the area's resources could not
support the growing Indian population. Thus,
beginning in the spring of 1880, Miles resorted
to allowing groups of Cheyenne to leave the
fort to hunt for game near the Tongue River, a
broken country of timber and grassland crossed
by multiple creeks and rivers that supported
ample wildlife. Convinced of the Northern
Cheyenne's loyalty, Miles saw these intermit-
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tent hunting parties as the perfect outlet to Fort
Keogh's overcrowding problem.
What began as temporary hunting excursions, however, began to take on a permanent
nature after Little Wolf's murder of Starving
Elk in December 1880. Ashamed and disgraced
by his actions, Little Wolf moved his large
family away from the fort to settle in the area
of Rosebud Creek, south of Keogh and west of
the Tongue River. Many Northern Cheyenne
soon followed to take advantage of that country's relatively abundant resources, and Miles's
initial, tacit approval of this informal method
for alleviating Fort Keogh's overcrowding eventually morphed into an official endorsement. In
the spring of 1882, the Fort Keogh commander
appointed Captain E. P. Ewers, leader of the
fort's Indian scouts, to oversee the settlement of
Two Moons' and Dull Knife's bands along the
same area as Little Wolf's camp near Rosebud
Creek. Ewers, in turn, settled yet another
Northern Cheyenne group on the Tongue
River under the watch of George Yoakam, the
Illinois private who had directed Indian farming at Fort Keogh. 2l Adapting to the practical
necessities of life along the western frontier,
the Cheyenne and the federal military forged
a pragmatic solution that placed these Indians
back in their ancestral home and outside the
immediate purview of the soldiers at Fort
Keogh.
Reporting on the settlements later that
fall, Ewers could barely conceal his pride. The
Cheyenne had constructed numerous framed
cabins and spaced them to allow each family
to claim the full homestead allotment of 160
acres. Their cattle herd had grown to 170 head,
and while the amount of ground under cultivation disappointed Ewers, he excused this
setback due to the summer's drought, concluding, "I believe that all of these Indians will do
better next year, as they are very anxious to
live like white men and remain in this country."zz Ewers's immediate superior, Lieutenant
Colonel Whistler, also seemed pleased with
the Indians' progress. Passing Ewers's report on
to his superiors and requesting more farming
equipment from the Indian Office, Whistler

noted, "[T]hese Indians have been self-sustaining for the past three years and are gradually
becoming more civilized-many beginning
to speak English."23 While civilian Indian
officials in Washington never sanctioned these
settlements-and in fact, Colonel Miles had
no legal authority to settle Indians off military
or Indian reservations-the pragmatic solution
was producing successful early returns.
It would be a mistake, however, to view
the Northern Cheyenne's willingness to
settle, farm, and ranch as an acquiescence
to adopt wholeheartedly the subsistence patterns, social organization, and cultural values
of a conquering foe. In fact, the Northern
Cheyenne only incorporated certain aspects
of the Euro-American "social-cultural-subsistence package" into their lifeways, limiting
their adaptation to those economic practices
that afforded the greatest control over their
own lives. This selective incorporation provided the Northern Cheyenne with multiple
options for obtaining the material base necessary for self-sufficiency and allowed them to
forgo federal rations for the first five years of
their return to Montana. 24 Acknowledging
the success of these economic adaptations,
Captain Ewers remarked that the Northern
Cheyenne "fed and clothed themselves,
bought their wagons and harness [sic], built
and furnished their houses, [all] with money
received from the sale of buffalo robes, produce and ponies and what was earned by
work and scouting."25 As Ewers's mention
of buffalo robes makes clear, however, while
farming, ranching, and settled wage work contributed to Northern Cheyenne subsistence,
the Cheyenne did not completely relinquish
more traditional subsistence practices, such as
hunting, to supplement their diet and income.
Moreover, the economic self-sufficiency garnered by this mixed economy afforded the
Northern Cheyenne the freedom to continue
social practices and cultural ceremonies that
sustained their distinctive community, most
importantly the frequent sojourns across the
Plains that were crucial to maintaining kinship ties. As Christina Berndt explains,
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By adopting some of the institutions of
the nation-state such as homesteading, they
had secured land in the heart of the homeland, freedom to hunt and continue ceremonies, and the ability to maintain their own
social life and kin ties with family far away.
They also managed to live outside the constant surveillance of the United States government. Homesteading by the Northern
Cheyenne surely looked to the government
as if these Plains peoples had given up their
tribal life, when in fact they had used an
institution the federal government provided
to maintain tribal life by maintaining land,
mobility and kin ties. 26
Again, the pragmatic solution constructed
within altered circumstances in the Northern
Plains brought important benefits to both
the federal government and the Northern
Cheyenne. While neither side completely
understood the other's perception of this
arrangement, each group's needs were being
met in a peaceful manner.

A LAND NOT THEIR OWN: WHITE
CONFLICT AND FEDERAL INTERVENTION
This mutually beneficial arrangement
between the federal military and the Northern
Cheyenne did not, however, satisfy all parties
in the region. As it turns out, the Northern
Cheyenne were reclaiming the Tongue River
and Rosebud Creek valleys at the same time
that powerful ranching interests set their sights
on these areas. In 1881, the Northern Pacific
Railroad extended its western terminus to
Miles City, the town founded in 1877 to serve
the needs of Fort Keogh and named after its
commander. With the arrival of the railroad,
local residents worked to make their town the
premier point of embarkation for eastbound
Montana and Wyoming cattle. City officials
constructed extensive stockyards and boosters
advertised the region's lush grasses and ample
water supplies. As one writer for the local
Yellowstone Journal summed it up, "Everything
in consideration ... there is no country near us
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that presents so many inducements to settlers
as the Tongue River valley."27
Ranchers in the region took heed, and by
the summer of 1882 they were driving large
herds up the Tongue River Valley toward Miles
City, right through the nascent Northern
Cheyenne communities. These cattle drives
were part and parcel of the heyday of the open
range in the Northern Plains. By virtue of the
1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, which recognized
several tribes' exclusive rights to northeastern
Wyoming and eastern Montana, vast spaces
of this region had been (ostensibly) closed to
white ranching. The 1870s Indian wars, however, reshuffled the regional map, creating a
potential bonanza for ranchers well positioned
to take advantage of this recently opened land.
This incentive, combined with the incessant
western push of the railroads, created a huge
boom in large-scale ranching in Montana and
Wyoming during the early 1880s. Between
1880 and 1883, for instance, eastern Montana
witnessed the complete depletion of its buffalo
herd and its replacement with over 600,000
head of cattle. In 1883 alone, over twenty
cattle companies with more than 12 million
dollars in capital registered to conduct ranching
operations in Wyoming. 2S Clearly, the plans laid
for this region were no small design. The presence of approximately 700 Cheyenne along the
region's primary cattle thoroughfare was not just
an annoying nuisance. It constituted a major
obstacle that had to be eliminated.
In the fall of 1882, area ranchers took the
first step to remove these human impediments.
Led by rancher Jesse Haston, they bypassed
federal authorities at Fort Keogh, whom they
perceived as sympathetic to the Indians, and
wrote directly to the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, Hiram Price, complaining of lost cattle.
Haston claimed more than 50,000 head of cattle
grazed in the vicinity south of Miles City, that
there was no game available for hunting, and
yet somehow the area supported 700 Cheyenne.
The only logical conclusion, he pressed, was that
Indians were killing white-owned cattle. 29 The
Wyoming Stock Growers Association lodged
similar, and perhaps coordinated, complaints
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to their territorial delegation around the same
time. 30 The solution offered by both parties was
the outright removal of the Indians from the
Tongue River Valley.
These efforts to convince federal officials
to remove the Northern Cheyenne in favor
of more pressing economic concerns triggered
a tense, twenty-year debate about the proper
use of the region's resources. When George
Yoakam responded with a fiery retort defending the Cheyenne and claiming the ranchers'
allegations amounted to nothing more than
"a scheme invented by a few stockmen to rob
these innocent Indians," Commissioner Price
sent a special agent to investigate the competing claims. 3l Reporting back in the spring of
1883, special agent George Milburn confirmed
Yoakam's defense, stating that the Indians "are
certainly peaceable, and my cattle depredation
investigation failed to elicit from the cattle men
who made complaint against these Indians any
positive evidence of malicious depredation anywhere." Moreover, Milburn concluded that sufficient game still existed to partially support the
Indian settlements, evidenced by oral reports
as well as the presence of thousands of buffalo
hides and animal skins found among the Indians
and at various trading posts in the region.32
Milburn's report stopped short, however,
of offering universal praise. He noted large
discrepancies between the good health of the
Northern Cheyenne settlements on Rosebud
Creek-which included Little Wolf's, Dull
Knife's, and Two Moons' bands-and the
desperate conditions facing the Tongue River
settlements overseen by Private Yoakam, which
were located directly in the path of the cattle
drives. Though Milburn blamed these discrepancies on Yoakam's poor leadership, claiming
the private to be a "monomaniac on Indian
rights" and an instigator of Indian-white
conflict, he could barely cloak his larger intentions. 33 Arguing the area's inherent value as
rangeland and noting the availability of farmland west of the Tongue River valley, Milburn
concluded that the first order of business must
be the removal of all Indians without proper
homestead claims in the Tongue River area to

a reservation where they could farm peaceably,
away from white threats. 34 Of course, the fact
that George Milburn soon left military service
to spearhead local ranchers' efforts to effect
this removal sheds much light on his motivations for suggesting the policy.35
Despite Milburn's suspect motivations, the
federal agent was attuned to the potential for
racial conflict in the area. Soon after his report
was filed, violence erupted between ranchers
and several Northern Cheyenne, resulting in
the shooting of two Indians and the burning
of a white-owned ranch. While later investigations revealed non-Indians provoked these
altercations, local reports focused on Northern
Cheyenne actions and the government's imprudent decision to settle wild Indians in land
suited best for white ranching. Influenced by
these misleading accounts, the incidents served
to galvanize a significant portion of the local
population against the Indians' presence and
produced a petition for their removal, submitted
to Commissioner Price in the summer of 1884.
Ordered to investigate the claims included
in this petition, the new Indian inspector M.
R. Barr once again found most allegations
baseless. Perhaps more importantly, Barr was
able to disaggregate the local white population into groups supporting Indian removal,
those opposed, and those simply indifferent to
the Northern Cheyenne's presence. His report
explained that large-scale ranching interests
drove opposition to the Northern Cheyenne in
order to maintain the open range, noting" [the
cattlemen] are at all times actively involved in
molding public sentiment in favor of that interest." Barr concluded that other area whites who
did not share these economic interests, including homesteading farmers and merchants who
traded with the Northern Cheyenne, generally
accepted the Indians' presence and saw them as
deserving neighbors. 36
Even noting these important distinctions,
Barr still believed that removal of the Northern
Cheyenne to more fertile areas was the best
solution for peace in the area, but Indian
resolve to remain in the region made this
plan implausible. As Two Moons explained to
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Barr, the Indians knew that ranchers falsely
accused them of killing cattle and had hoped
to provoke open conflict in order to effect their
removal. Nonetheless, Two Moons reminded
the inspector that his people remained peaceful, were attempting to farm and ranch, and
thus deserved to stay. As the chief pointed out,
"We came here to make our permanent homes
and it is our best interest to behave ourselves
well. If we were roving about we could then
take our chances, but not now when we are permanently settled."37 It was a logical argument.
Faced with conflicting and intransigent
interests, Barr ultimately recommended a
small reservation centered around Little Wolf's
original settlement on Rosebud Creek, where
the land was more suitable to farming and
farther removed from white cattle operations
in the Tongue River Valley. Other federal
officials soon supported this seemingly pragmatic compromise and ultimately convinced
Commissioner Price that this small reserve represented the best of several imperfect options. 38
On November 26, 1884, President Chester
Arthur accepted Commissioner Price's recommendation and issued an executive order creating the Northern Cheyenne Reservation. Less
than ten years after the Battle of Little Bighorn
and the removal of Northern Cheyenne from
southeastern Montana, the tribe gained official
recognition of their right to exist within their
ancestral homeland.

A RESERVATION OF tHEIR OWN:
CONTINUED WHITE CONFLICT AND
RESERVATION EXTENSION
While the importance of the official establishment of a Northern Cheyenne reservation
should not be discounted, this act did little
to resolve many of the Indians' immediately
pressing concerns. The majority still eked out
a meager existence in a difficult country that
was becoming increasingly occupied by those
whose interests ran counter to their own. In
theory, the creation of the reservation promised to relax some of these constricting pressures, but in practice the Northern Cheyenne
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continued to struggle with an unfamiliar
subsistence model, hampered by a limited land
base. Moreover, multiple external factors
worked against the development of a self-sustaining reservation. The first of these was partially a function of the official act establishing
the reservation, as this action served notice to
all Northern Cheyenne that a formal sanctuary
had been created in their ancestral homeland,
and thus inferred their right to return. Before
long, military officials faced a flood of Northern
Cheyenne hoping to resettle, which increased
pressures on the tiny reservation's already
stressed resources. 39
Unfortunately for the Northern Cheyenne,
more Indians were arriving at the newly created reservation at the same time that material
conditions on the tiny reserve were deteriorating. The Northern Cheyenne's first permanent
Indian agent, R. L. Upshaw, arrived in 1886 just
in time to report on the "driest summer known
in this region for the past ten years." These conditions undoubtedly contributed to the massive
wildfires that devastated the reservation that
year, destroying what was left of those crops
not already decimated by the arrival of the
"potato-bug."4o The brutal 1886-87 winter then
followed, which Upshaw described as "one of
the most severe experienced in this country for
years" and noted the Indians were lucky to lose
only 10 percent of their small cattle herd.4! This
combination of unfortunate climatic events
led the new agent to conclude solemnly, "The
agricultural products will make no appreciable
addition to the food supply, and these Indians,
having no poultry, no hogs, sheep, or cattle,
and the game having been swept beyond their
reach, are left entirely dependent on the charity
of the Government for every particle of good
that they consume.'>42 The resourceful tribe that
federal officials had so proudly upheld for their
self-sufficiency just a few years earlier had been
reduced by a disastrous set of circumstances to
dependent government wards (See Fig. 1).
To make matters worse, the Northern
Cheyenne's dependence on government largesse
increased at the same time federal officials
were reducing their financial commitment to
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FIG. 1. "Cheyenne Chief Two Moons' Lodge," L.A. Huffman, c. 1886. Courtesy of Montana Historical Society
Research Center, Archives.
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them. In fact, while President Arthur created
an official Northern Cheyenne Reservation in
1884, Congress included no provisions in the
federal budget for its maintenance. Instead,
the only appropriation made for the Northern
Cheyenne came by virtue of previous treaty
agreements, and these funds were committed
to those Cheyenne remaining on the Wind
River Reservation in Wyoming Territory. Even
when Congress passed last-minute measures to
divert emergency provisions to the Montana
Northern Cheyenne and later enacted legislation to redistribute treaty funds between
all Northern Cheyenne groups on a pro rata
basis, the overall expenditures budgeted for
the tribe still decreased during the mid-1880s.
The situation became so dire that by 1885
the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs, J.
D. C. Atkins, wrote to President Cleveland
specifically requesting additional funds for
the Northern Cheyenne in order "to meet the
pressing emergency and to avoid distress, suffering and death among these Indians from starvation and exposure to the winter weather."43
Atkins's words echoed those of his predecessor,
Hiram Price, who complained the previous
year that the paltry sum Congress intended to
split between the Northern Cheyenne groups
was insufficient: "I have no doubt," Price complained, "that when the [budgeted funds] for
food and clothing is divided between those in
Wyoming and on the Tongue River, neither of
these bands will have sufficient to prevent starvation or depredation."44 Events would soon
confirm these ominous warnings.
The final and perhaps most crucial factor
working against the Northern Cheyenne's
ability to develop a sustainable and peaceful
existence along Rosebud Creek was the continued presence of whites on the reservation.
By the time of the reservation's 1884 establishment, many white settlers had already staked
homestead claims in the area around Rosebud
Creek. 45 These legal claims provided ground
for area ranchers to argue against the reservation's establishment, claiming administration
would be too cumbersome and the potential
for conflict too high.46 Whether white ranch-
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ers were truly concerned about administrative
difficulties is debatable, but what is not is the
fact that these early settlers occupied much
of the reservation's best land. Special agent
Bannister, who arrived on the reservation in
early 1885 to investigate the suitability of the
recently established boundaries, confirmed
that "[a]11 the best agricultural land upon
the Reservation was taken up by white men
before the Reservation was created." Bannister
deemed this situation so dire that he recommended the president rescind the executive
order establishing the reserve, not because he
opposed a reservation for the Cheyenne, but
because he believed the remaining land could
not sustain the Indian population. 47
Bannister's recommendation, however,
went unheeded, setting the stage for yet more
tension between the Northern Cheyenne and
white ranchers. While successful white settlers
cultivated land and grazed cattle and sheep,
the Northern Cheyenne experienced depleting
rations and mounting hunger. The commanding officer at nearby Fort Custer confirmed the
dangerous potential for conflict in the fall of
1886, explaining, "The country surrounding
the Tongue River Agency is all filled up with
herds of cattle and sheep and in [the Northern
Cheyenne's] starving condition the temptation
to kill beeves and sheep is strong."48 Other
military officials echoed the warning, including a Major Snyder who reported from Fort
Keogh that "with large herds of fat, sleek cattle
of white men grazing on almost every hill of the
Tongue River Reservation, as trespassers, and
Indian women and children crying for food, but
one result will follow: some of the cattle will
go to supply the wants of the Indians."49 Two
Moons himself even traveled to Fort Keogh in
November 1886 to complain of the destruction
caused by the whites' vast herds. He explained
that cattlemen on the reservation drove their
stock through the Indians' small but vital
gardens, forcing the tribe to kill the remainder of their own cattle to keep from starving
(See Fig. 2). "So long as cattlemen are allowed
to range cattle on the reservation," the chief
warned, "there will be trouble."so
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FIG. 2. "Beef Issues, Northern Cheyenne," Christian Barthelmess, c. 1889. Courtesy of Denver Public
Library, Digital Collections.

Off the reserve, the potential for conflict was
no better. The original reservation boundaries
excluded those Northern Cheyenne settlements along the Tongue River because, among
other reasons, federal agents determined that
this major cattle thoroughfare constituted a
poor spot for an Indian reservation devoted to
land cultivation. As federal officials discovered
the inadequacy of the original reserve for supplying the needs of an increasing Northern
Cheyenne population, they encouraged the
Tongue River Indians to file homestead claims
under the 1875 Indian Homestead Law, which
many did. 51 Unfortunately, because the region
had not yet been formally surveyed, this
approach brought its own set of problems.
Well-intentioned officials like George Yoakam
assisted Indians in filing homestead claims, but
the result was confusing and overlapping land
claims, providing yet another source for potential conflict with whites.

Sensing the precarious situation created
by these competing claims, the Secretary
of Interior ordered the region's first comprehensive survey in the summer of 1886 and
requested that the General Land Office prohibit white homestead entries until the survey
was completed and Indian homesteads properly
allocated. 52 Suspicious white ranchers interpreted this land freeze as a de facto reservation
extension, and began colluding with the local
land agent to frustrate federal intentions by
continuing to file land claims. Because the
reservation boundaries in this unsurveyed
region were unclear, many of these new white
claims impinged on the reservation itself,
adding further fire to the country's strained
relations. Local whites even submitted a petition to President Benjamin Harrison demanding the reservation be thrown open to public
homesteading, claiming "the experiment ... of
sandwiching whites and Indians together has
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long since proved abortive, and should ... be
ended without further delay."53 Tensions ran so
high that in the spring of 1890 the federal army
established Camp Merritt on the reservation
itself to ensure the peace. 54
Despite the federal government's best efforts,
this fragile order would not hold. Less than
a month after Camp Merritt's establishment,
local officials discovered the slain body of a
white rancher next to a rotting cattle carcass.
Immediately, rumors circulated that Indians
had killed the rancher after he stumbled upon
their illegal slaying of white-owned cattle.
The Yellowstone Journal, the unequivocal
mouthpiece of ranching interests, whipped
the countryside into a frenzy, reporting that
half-starved Indians were "armed to the teeth
and bounteously supplied with ammunition,"
and warning that "[ilf the government does
not move in this matter it is not improbable
that the stockmen and cowboys will."55 Indian
agent James Cooper confirmed that "[r]umors
of a cowboy invasion were rampant, as was also
the report that the Cheyenne had gone on the
war path. Both Indians and whites were equally
alarmed lest one or the other would precipitate
a fight."56 Tensions increased further at the end
of the summer when those Cheyenne arrested
for the rancher's murder were released for a lack
of evidence. That same week, another body was
found murdered on the reservation. This time,
the victim was a fifteen-year-old boy, and again,
accusations flew that Indians had silenced the
young man after he stumbled upon the butchering of white-owned cattle. Reporting on both
the release of the suspected killers and the news
of yet another death, the Yellowstone Journal
surmised:
The [release of the suspects] was not
unexpected, but the knowledge that justice
was probably to fail awakened in the minds
of the settlers who live among these murdering savages the self-reliant American
feelings that if the law couldn't protect
them they could and would protect themselves, and that the killing of another white
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would be the signal for the inauguration of a
bloody war of retaliationY
Before white ranchers could dole out vigilante justice, however, the Northern Cheyenne
punished their own. In what the local press
described dramatically as "blood atonement,"
the Cheyenne Indian police led a contingent
of soldiers to arrest the boy's killers, two young
Cheyenne named Head Chief and Young
Mule. 58 After a short parlay between Cheyenne
leaders and the confessed killers, Two Moons
reported that the perpetrators steadfastly
affirmed "they will not be taken alive and if
we failed in our barter for them their message
to the agent was 'select the place for meeting
and we will come to die in your sight.",59 With
the fury of local whites at a fever pitch, there
was little hope for a bargain. Federal troops,
accompanied by twenty deputized Cheyenne,
organized quickly to make the arrest. Holding
firm to their promise, however, the two young
Cheyenne met the arresting force in full war
paint, charged through the assembled lines
firing their weapons, and were eventually
struck down by a combined volley of bullets.
Though remarkable for its theatrics, this particular conflict between Northern Cheyenne
and whites in the Tongue River valley ended
like many others, with the death of two more
Indians.
In reporting on these greatly celebrated
deaths, local whites continued to imbue the
Cheyenne with romantic images of savagery
that reconfirmed their beliefs that Indians were
incapable of sharing their landscape. While a
few accounts mentioned in passing the valuable assistance of the Indian police or noted
the fact that the majority of the "tribe seem[ed]
anxious to have the murderers arrested and
punished," most reports focused on the dead
Indians' gallant yet irrational suicidal charge. 6o
The Yellowstone Journal gushed, "[T]here has
been few more romantic episodes in Indian
annals than the killing of the two Cheyenne
murderers" and that "the audacity displayed
in this desperate attack upon two troops of
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cavalry was probably never surpassed in the
records of Indian bravery.,,61 The same paper
also reminded its readers that "all [the dead
Indians] wanted was a chance to fight and if
possible kill some more white men before they
were killed."62 Likewise, the Billings Gazette
emphasized the scary precedent of defiance
this episode reflected, commenting that "[the
Indians'] object in doing so now seems to be
to provoke a fight.,,63 Editorial claims such as
these effectively accomplished two tasks: they
permanently located Indian behavior in a past
time of nomadic savagery and warned that such
immutable characteristics would produce more
bloodshed. Combined, these dual messages left
readers with little flexibility in conceiving of
ways to resolve the ongoing problems between
the impoverished Northern Cheyenne and
ambitious white ranchers. Again, the only solution appeared to be the complete removal of
Indians from the region.
In the midst of this fresh round of violence,
Congress commissioned a special committee
to investigate conditions in the Tongue River
valley and propose those alternative solutions
that white ranchers seemed incapable of producing. Led by General Nelson Miles, the Northern
Cheyenne's old protector in the region, this
"Northern Cheyenne Commission" blamed the
recent incidents on deplorable reservation conditions that forced the Indians to hunt whiteowned cattle for survival. Far from offering a
holistic solution to the subsistence problems of
the Northern Cheyenne or squelching white
desires for additional ranchland, however, Miles
focused on Northern Cheyenne dissatisfaction
with the slow pace of tribal reunification, especially the federal government's refusal to reunite
those Northern Cheyenne still located at the
Sioux's Pine Ridge Agency with those on the
reservation. Preoccupied by this concern, the
Commission recommended only the immediate removal of all Pine Ridge Cheyenne to Fort
Keogh, where they could be observed until
some later date when they were deemed fit to be
located on the reservation. 64
This shortsighted and limited plan pleased
no one in the region. The proposed increase in

Indian population to the region incensed white
settlers, while the denial of full reunification
on the reservation also upset the Northern
Cheyenne. The new Northern Cheyenne
agent, John Tully, communicated that Miles's
report so "unsettled the Indians and shook
their faith in the Great Father in Washington"
that Tully was forced to take it upon himself
to offer yet another solution. The agent argued
that in order to meet the government's express
goals of consolidating all Northern Cheyenne
on one reservation and allocating to each
family the 160 acres necessary to pursue settled
ranching or agriculture, "it will be absolutely
necessary to extend the boundary lines" east to
the Tongue River. 65 For the first time, a federal
agent proposed the specific reservation boundaries that would later become law. Punctuated
by his suggestion to fence the boundaries of the
new reservation "hog tight and cattle strong,"
Tully also articulated the spatial logic of segregating the Northern Cheyenne from local
whites so as to manage their progression into
civilization. 66
As opposed to previous pleas from Northern
Cheyenne allies, Tully's novel solution of
expanding the reservation boundaries and
removing troublesome whites soon found
ardent support from those within the federal
bureaucracy with the power to effect this
result. In 1892, Congress established the Sioux
Commission, similar to Miles's Northern
Cheyenne Commission, to report on conditions and propose solutions for several Sioux
reservations in the wake of the Ghost Dance
movement. Since the Northern Cheyenne
retained treaty rights to the Pine Ridge
Reservation, the Commission was forced to
weigh-in on the Northern Cheyenne situation,
and the Commission ultimately made the case
for a reservation extension even more emphatically than Tully. First dismissing any claims of
mass Indian depredations as unfounded and
based solely on the actions of a few desperate
Indians, the Sioux Commission took advantage of the recently completed reservation
survey to provide details on the extent of white
trespassers, as well as bona fide homesteaders.
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Finding the removal of these elements much
more acceptable than the "palpable injustice"
of yet another Northern Cheyenne transfer,
the Sioux Commission concluded,

If treated with impartial justice, the
Cheyennes are tractable and will readily
respond to civilizing influences. They have
raised crops in goodly portions. They are
now cutting hay in large quantities [See
Figs. 3-6]. They are faithful in service and
desire to be law-abiding. Whatever friction exists between them and neighboring
white settlers will be readily removed if the
laws now existing are fully and impartially
enforced against trespassers, irrespective of
race. 67
Both the Secretary of Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs readily endorsed the
Sioux Commission's report, and Commissioner
Morgan quickly submitted to Congress a proposed bill to effect its recommendations. 68
Finally, the Northern Cheyenne had secured
important allies in influential positions within
the federal bureaucracy.
Government bureaucracy being what it
is, the ultimate extension of the Northern
Cheyenne Reservation to the boundaries
defined by Tully and the Sioux Commission
would not come until 1900. By then, several
more Cheyenne and white settlers would be
killed in the conflict over the region's finite
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FIGS. 3-6. Ranching and agriculture on the Northern Cheyenne Reservation, Thomas Bailey Marquis, c. 1920s.
Courtesy of Buffalo Bill Historical Center, Great Plains People Collection.
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resources. 69 Still, James McLaughlin, the special agent dispatched to execute the buyout
of bona fide white homesteaders and the
removal of other trespassers, could not help
but commend the Northern Cheyenne on
their restraint. In typical backhanded fashion,
McLaughlin noted,
The anomalous conditions that have existed
upon the Northern Cheyenne Reservation
have been very unsatisfactory, in consequence of which white settlers have suffered financial loss and advancement of the
Indians greatly retarded, and it is only to be
wondered at that the Northern Cheyennes,
who are among the least civilized of any of
the Indian tribes, conducted themselves so
peaceably during the past fourteen years on
that reservation.7°
McLaughlin's report noted the "great deal of
friction between whites and Indians" caused
by these "anomalous conditions," but its focus
remained on providing a detailed plan and
budget to rectify the situation, complete with
inventories of white-owned property and preliminary purchase agreements. Presented to
Congress and the president in November 1898,
President McKinley issued an executive order
enlarging the reservation to its present boundaries on March 19, 1900.71 This time, Congress
and the president acted in unison, and the
Indian Appropriations Act of 1900 included
funds for the reservation's extensionP With
the last of the white settlers removed from the
reservation in 1904-a full twenty years after
the original grant of a reserve-the Northern
Cheyenne had finally secured a place of their
own.
CONCLUSION

There is little typical about the Northern
Cheyenne's reclamation of a small portion of
their traditional homeland. What seems certain is that on the heels of the most celebrated
Indian victory of the nineteenth century,
federal efforts to defeat this tribe resulted in

the scattering of various Northern Cheyenne
bands across the West and Midwest. From this
fragmented situation, one Northern Cheyenne
group struggled against innumerable odds to
return to Montana, where they worked tirelessly to establish a home to which others could
also return. In an era when the overwhelming
majority of Native Americans were losing
their land base, the fact that the Northern
Cheyenne were able to not only secure a reservation where there was none, but also expand
its acreage by the turn of the century demonstrates the exceptional nature of their account.
To stop there would be to deliver a remarkable story of Indian agency that many western
narratives often neglect. Even those histories
that recognize the incredible resilience of this
tribe, however, tend to focus on their combative exploits and fail to capture other, more
crucial factors that produced the Northern
Cheyenne Reservation. Far beyond raw determination and martial expertise, the Northern
Cheyenne displayed a remarkable ability to
adapt to changing conditions in the Northern
Plains and adopt those customs most likely to
provide material security and local sovereignty.
Foremost among these was a willingness to
engage in settled agricultural and ranching,
which the Northern Cheyenne believed would
bring them subsistence, control over their own
lives, and a cooperative relationship with the
federal government. Early efforts upon their
return to Montana seemed to validate this strategy, as the group cultivated land, raised cattle,
and were even rewarded with an official reservation. Far from the heroic yet irrational savages of popular myth, the Northern Cheyenne
understood how their 1877 defeat and dispersal
altered power dynamics in the Northern Plains
and took pragmatic steps to adapt their lifestyles
to reclaim some sovereignty.
In some ways, however, the Northern Cheyenne fell victim to their own early successes.
With the establishment of the reservation, other
Cheyenne groups around the country sought to
join their brethren's attempt at settled living in
the Tongue River and Rosebud Creek valleys.
This influx of population strained area resources
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while federal officials struggled to efficiently and
fairly reallocate diminishing provisions. Those
incoming Cheyenne were forced to settle in less
desirable areas not already occupied, and their
productivity suffered accordingly. Combined
with disastrous weather conditions during the
first few years of the reservation, life back at
home was not as imagined, but instead became a
desperate business of survival.
Of course, the Northern Cheyenne were not
simply free to pursue any mode of subsistence
to survive these terrible conditions. Federal
officials and local whites intent on aiding the
Northern Cheyenne carried preconceived
notions of how the Indians must subsist in
order to evolve into yeoman American farmers.
Conceiving of the reservation as an incubator
for this process, Anglo allies worked hard to
constrain the Northern Cheyenne within this
idealized agricultural landscape and were slow
to discover the inadequacy of the assigned
land base.
Moreover, though this broken country of
sheltered valleys and ample water supplies had
previously provided sufficient resources, a powerful new element limited Indian access. After
the 1877 surrender of Sioux and Northern
Cheyenne forces, white settlers flooded into
the region seeking to take advantage of the
same benevolent environments the Northern
Cheyenne valued. Beyond simply adding more
competitors for the region's resources, these
newcomers envisioned the surrounding landscape as ideal ranching country best exploited
by large-scale, white-owned operations, not
nomadic savages incapable of "progressing"
into settled agriculturalists. Because this landscape vision left no room for Indian cultivators,
white ranchers worked to undermine Northern
Cheyenne subsistence efforts and consistently
argued the Indian presence was a threat to the
region's peace and prosperity. When desperate conditions moved individual Northern
Cheyenne to commit "depredations," these
acts served only to validate ranchers' claims
that Indians were incapable of civilized living.
Recast as savages once again, violence amongst
the races seemed justified.
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Fortunately for the Northern Cheyenne,
the federal government had seen enough violence on the Northern Plains. Exhausted by
years of war with various tribes, the government took a different tack in the 1890s by
appointing several commissions to investigate
Indian conditions and to propose peaceful, if
not always entirely equitable, solutions. The
Northern Cheyenne were beneficiaries of this
new approach and worked hard to demonstrate
the tribe's recent history of cooperation, their
willingness to engage in "civilized" agricultural
pursuits, and the terrible conditions present
on the reservation. Faced with this set of facts,
federal officials chose a new path, intervening to remove troublesome whites and extend
the boundaries of the Northern Cheyenne
Reservation. Though this extension was
certainly the product of Indian agency, it is
important to be specific about the particular
form this agency took. Moving beyond the
romantic tales of Indian violence that often
obscure more than they reveal, the Northern
Cheyenne's pragmatic adoption of non-Indian
subsistence practices secured and later enlarged
their reservation.
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